Network facts
Two GIWA-documented faucets supply gas ETH:
https://faucet.giwa.io: 0.005 ETH per 24 hours.- Nodit faucet at
https://faucet.lambda256.io/giwa-sepolia: 0.01 ETH per 24 hours.
Tokscale deployments
GIWA does not officially support x402, so Tokscale ported the stack itself. These contracts were deployed by Tokscale, each with a signed deployment record pinning its runtime code hash.
Deployment details:
- tUSD was deployed through a dedicated deployer contract,
0x016af5632b7d2d3bbd2a6e589b65e828d1a5b125, whose own deployment transaction0x109e586dde5c93d017c9aab8edf5bce305f4fecf9a1220efcb5712752340d7c7landed at block 31,330,856. The record pins the runtime code hash and the EIP-712 domain separator. - The Upto proxy was CREATE2-deployed in transaction
0xea7708f6a0ac3f2f872b1ea6be99f8d010064d76e5e0e390bc49669a17b66920(block 31,395,852). ItsPERMIT2()getter reads back the canonical Permit2 address. - The Exact proxy and the ERC-6492 validator exist because the pinned x402-rs facilitator image hardcodes both addresses in its startup check for every configured chain. They were deployed in transactions
0x2e5516c9aa366833c3aaa03e056a8de39af5554da3423c5ec75b8c7bccba4673(block 31,398,196) and0x147fdceeb952c35b0c2156417e5d37b797525c2ac3c3ed2b06b955065df4975d(block 31,398,214). The validator’s salt is vanity-mined: its first 4 bytes decode as ASCII “x402”. - Multicall3 sits at its canonical cross-chain CREATE2 address. The record pins the observed runtime code hash.
Preinstalls and predeploys
These already existed on GIWA Sepolia. Tokscale verified their bytecode and builds against them rather than deploying them.
Dojang (도장, the seal) is GIWA’s verified-identity attestation system. Tokscale reads it, and gating Passport eligibility on it is a Phase 2 mechanism. See Dojang: On-Chain Attestations.
Proven transactions
Two transactions anchor the payment claims.- ERC-3009
exactsettlement: transaction0xad1a2f7b5aff4033e7779437ec487e8b51eb8170ba1c6c8cc971f6de37fcb9f8moved 1.0 tUSD (1,000,000 base units) from payer0x02cdd4a6f1308d310d624292a731c2d276310dc5to0x016af5632b7d2d3bbd2a6e589b65e828d1a5b125at block 31,331,118, through facilitator0xab5805032f0fd80e56c4d2a0fd72d961500c2cf8. A retry with the same authorization was replay-rejected. This is the single direct settlement executed on the public chain. - Facilitator smoke test: settlement transaction
0x890c08920ae4672b27204fc2b0a2073264148d48f85792db7b6e5424ff9e265apassed against the pinned facilitator imageghcr.io/x402-rs/x402-facilitator@sha256:89ab5c03…after the prerequisite contracts above were deployed. This answered the open question of whether x402 works on GIWA at all.
Evidence
Three read-only targets check this state directly and need no secrets beyond RPC access:Next steps
- For every target and pass marker, including the local proofs, see Verification Log.
- For the x402 stack these contracts serve, see x402 Payments on GIWA.
- For how upstream bytecode is pinned before it ships, see Contracts.
- For which of these deployments backs a live product path today, see Live Evidence.